"U.S. DoD joint doctrine is insufficient for incorporating…" — Andrzej V. Kujawski (#c370)

Card #c370IR // #c370SynthesisMilitary report

U.S. DoD joint doctrine is insufficient for incorporating cyberspace operations into counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns — existing doctrine "does not address many types of missions and operations that can produce effects in support of the COIN tenets"; the thesis maps cyberspace actions from joint cyberspace doctrine against COIN tenets in a matrix, evaluates which effects are accounted for, seen in actual COINs, and significant — then proposes doctrine additions for the highest-impact, least-accounted-for intersections, drawing only on unclassified sources.

— In our words · Source: Cyberspace actions in a counterinsurgency (Andrzej V. Kujawski)

[Use when]

When two mature toolkits don't connect, the missing map is the vulnerability — building the matrix of what-doctrine-misses is how you find the guidance gap before the enemy finds the operational one.

[Why it matters]

It names a real doctrine gap — the military has both cyber capabilities and COIN doctrine, but no adequate bridge between them — and systematically prioritizes exactly which missing guidance matters most.