"Unconventional warfare began in World War II as…" — Timothy S. Ball (#c373)

Card #c373IR // #c373SynthesisMilitary report

Unconventional warfare began in World War II as a defensive tactic for assisting an occupied ally, but Special Forces later redefined it to include offensive regime change; offensive UW, practiced extensively by the CIA during the Cold War, produced poor results, and it remains problematic — unreliable proxy forces, unpredictable outcomes, negative international perception. Defensive UW, under certain conditions, remains justified and practical.

— In our words · Source: From successful defense to problematic offense: the devolution of unconventional warfare (Timothy S. Ball)

[Use when]

Offense by proxy inherits everyone else's agency — if you can't vet the proxy, you can't own the outcome.

[Why it matters]

It names the mechanism behind every proxy-war debate — backing someone else's fighters looks cheap until the proxies, the blowback, and the perception bill arrive. The CIA's own 2014 study (cited in the thesis) found arming rebels seldom works.