"Yemen's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies were less effective…" — Ryan Johnson (#c372)

Card #c372IR // #c372SynthesisMilitary report

Yemen's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies were less effective against the Houthi movement than against AQAP because of four factors: the military's poor COIN/CT policies, the international effort's focus on AQAP, the Houthis' ability to recruit and mobilize large numbers of followers, and the Houthi leadership's pragmatic alliances — together these gave the Houthis the advantage over both AQAP and the Yemeni government.

— In our words · Source: Yemen: Comparative Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (Ryan Johnson)

[Use when]

Counterinsurgency fails when it fights the wrong enemy first — the international fixation on AQAP left the Houthis room to out-organize and out-ally everyone.

[Why it matters]

Written in March 2015 as the Houthis captured Sanaa, it diagnosed the exact resilience mechanisms — mass mobilization plus pragmatic alliances — that explain how the Houthis survived a decade of war and now hold the Red Sea chokepoint.