Getting to Yes
Negotiation — the Harvard method (2nd ed.): separate the people from the problem, focus on interests not positions, invent options for mutual gain, insist on objective criteria.
Negotiation — the Harvard method (2nd ed.): separate the people from the problem, focus on interests not positions, invent options for mutual gain, insist on objective criteria.
The Kennedy-era test-ban talks broke down over a count, three inspections or ten, when neither side had defined what one inspection was.
"The Soviet Union finally agreed to three inspections. The United States insisted on no less than ten. And there the talks broke down — over positions — despite the fact that no one understood whether an 'inspection' would involve one person looking around for one day, or a hundred people prying indiscriminately for a month."
Why it matters
The Kennedy-era test-ban talks broke down over a count, three inspections or ten, when neither side had defined what one inspection was.
Use when: Two sides are dug in on competing figures and nobody has defined what the figures mean.
Israel saw Sadat as the man who had attacked it four years before.
"Sadat flew to the capital of his enemies, a disputed capital which not even the United States, Israel's best friend, had recognized. Instead of acting as an enemy, Sadat acted as a partner."
Why it matters
Israel saw Sadat as the man who had attacked it four years before. He changed that with an act, not an argument, and the authors say it is hard to imagine the peace treaty without it.
Use when: The negotiation is stuck because the other side's image of you makes agreement unthinkable.
The terms didn't change.
"Terms negotiated between a major city and its Hispanic community on municipal jobs were unacceptable to the mayor — until the agreement was withdrawn and the mayor was allowed to announce the same terms as his own decision, carrying out a campaign promise."
Why it matters
The terms didn't change. What changed was who announced them and which past promise they fulfilled. Face is about reconciling the stand with past words.
Use when: The other side agrees with the deal but cannot be seen agreeing with you.
A 1950s steel-industry committee turned "don't react" into a turn-taking rule.
"The members of the committee adopted the rule that only one person could get angry at a time. This made it legitimate for others not to respond stormily to an angry outburst… 'That's OK. It's his turn.'"
Why it matters
A 1950s steel-industry committee turned "don't react" into a turn-taking rule. Others did not have to answer an outburst, and anyone who broke the rule showed they had lost self-control and lost some face.
Use when: A negotiation keeps derailing because anger is contagious and every outburst demands a reply.
Waldheim's 1980 arrival line used two words that read as insults in Persian.
"Similarly, the word 'mediator' in Persian suggests 'meddler', someone who is barging in uninvited… His efforts were seriously set back when Iranian national radio and television broadcast in Persian a remark he reportedly made on his arrival in Tehran: 'I have come as a mediator to work out a compromise.' Within an hour of the broadcast his car was being stoned by angry Iranians."
Why it matters
Waldheim's 1980 arrival line used two words that read as insults in Persian. Check what your key words mean in the other side's ears before you open your mouth on their airwaves.
Use when: You are negotiating across languages or cultures and your standard vocabulary may detonate.
Asking each side "why" turned open-versus-closed into air-versus-draft, and the answer was a third option nobody was arguing about.
"She asks one why he wants the window open: 'To get some fresh air.' She asks the other why he wants it closed: 'To avoid the draft.' After thinking a minute, she opens wide a window in the next room, bringing in fresh air without a draft."
Why it matters
Asking each side "why" turned open-versus-closed into air-versus-draft, and the answer was a third option nobody was arguing about. Borrowed by the authors from Mary Parker Follett.
Use when: Two positions look irreconcilable and everyone is haggling over how far to open the same window.
The maps dividing the Sinai failed every time.
"At Camp David, President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel agreed to a plan that would return the Sinai to complete Egyptian sovereignty and, by demilitarizing large areas, would still assure Israeli security. The Egyptian flag would fly everywhere, but Egyptian tanks would be nowhere near Israel."
Why it matters
The maps dividing the Sinai failed every time. Splitting sovereignty from security gave Egypt the flag (its interest) and Israel demilitarization (its interest) instead of splitting the territory.
Use when: Both sides claim the same thing but actually want different things from it.
The authors map the Iranian students' yes/no ledger as the students saw it in 1980, and keeping the hostages looks rational from inside it.
"In constructing the other side's presently perceived choice the first question to ask is 'Whose decision do I want to affect?' The second question is what decision people on the other side now see you asking them to make."
Why it matters
The authors map the Iranian students' yes/no ledger as the students saw it in 1980, and keeping the hostages looks rational from inside it. Your arguments bounce off because you are answering a question they are not asking.
Use when: The other side keeps refusing something you think is obviously in their interest.
The U.S.
"The Mexicans had a strong interest not only in getting a good price for their gas but also in being treated with respect and a sense of equality… Rather than sell their gas, the Mexican government began to burn it off, and any chance of agreement on a lower price became politically impossible."
Why it matters
The U.S. Secretary of Energy treated it as a fight over money and blocked a price already agreed. Mexico wanted respect and equality too. It burned the gas off, and a lower price became politically impossible.
Use when: You are tempted to use leverage to squeeze a better number and the relationship has to survive the deal.
Deals exist because of differences, not agreements: the Law of the Sea priced seabed mining low while companies' risk was high and higher once risk fell.
"In this difference lies the potential for a bargain advantageous to both sides. Risk can be traded for revenue."
Why it matters
Deals exist because of differences, not agreements: the Law of the Sea priced seabed mining low while companies' risk was high and higher once risk fell. Hunt for what each side values differently and trade across it.
Use when: The negotiation looks zero-sum because both sides seem to want the same thing.
An outside MIT model of seabed-mining economics moved both dug-in sides, and each could say the model changed its mind, not the opponent.
"India, representing the Third World bloc, proposed an initial fee for companies mining in the deep seabed of $60 million per site. The United States rejected the proposal, suggesting there be no initial fee… No one backed down; no one appeared weak — just reasonable."
Why it matters
An outside MIT model of seabed-mining economics moved both dug-in sides, and each could say the model changed its mind, not the opponent. Bring in a neutral standard both sides can test proposals against.
Use when: Two sides are dug in on competing numbers and neither can yield without looking weak.
The informed party proposes, the uninformed party picks first.
"The solution devised was to agree that a private company seeking to mine the seabed would present the Enterprise with two proposed mining sites. The Enterprise would pick one site for itself and grant the company a license to mine the other. Since the company would not know which site it would get, it would have an incentive to make both sites as promising as possible."
Why it matters
The informed party proposes, the uninformed party picks first. The procedure turns the expert's knowledge advantage into the other side's protection.
Use when: One side knows far more than the other and you need a fair division that doesn't require trusting the expert.
Tom Griffith never answered the adjuster's number with a counter-number.
"I see. How did you reach that figure?… I understand, but what standard did you use to determine that amount? Do you know where I can buy a comparable car for that much?"
Why it matters
Tom Griffith never answered the adjuster's number with a counter-number. Two questions moved the discussion from the figure to the reasoning behind it, which is where you can actually argue. He walked out with a check for $8,024.
Use when: The other side opens with a take-it-or-leave-it number and no justification.
The authors say power here was set by each side's best alternative, not budget or clout.
"In one case, a small town negotiated a company with a factory just outside the town limits from a 'goodwill' payment of $300,000 a year to one of $2,300,000 a year… The town knew exactly what it would do if no agreement was reached: It would expand the town limits to include the factory and then tax the factory the full residential rate of some $2,500,000 a year."
Why it matters
The authors say power here was set by each side's best alternative, not budget or clout. The town knew exactly what it would do with no deal: take in the factory and tax it at about $2.5 million a year.
Use when: You are the smaller party and the other side assumes you have nowhere to go.
Nasser burst out laughing: "Oh, would she have trouble at home!" Walking him through the morning after his own demand exposed it as unworkable, from his side.
"The American asked, 'What would happen to Golda Meir if tomorrow morning she appeared on Israeli radio and television and said, 'On behalf of the people of Israel I hereby promise to withdraw from every inch of territory occupied in '67…''"
Why it matters
Nasser burst out laughing: "Oh, would she have trouble at home!" Walking him through the morning after his own demand exposed it as unworkable, from his side. The authors say this may have contributed to his stated willingness later that day to accept a cease-fire.
Use when: The other side's position sounds principled but collapses the moment you imagine it implemented.
The one-text procedure: one draft nobody owns, criticism instead of concessions, repeat.
"After thirteen days and some twenty-three drafts, the United States had a text it was prepared to recommend. When President Carter did recommend it, Israel and Egypt accepted."
Why it matters
The one-text procedure: one draft nobody owns, criticism instead of concessions, repeat. Each draft is easier to criticize than a position is to abandon, so positions soften without anyone losing face.
Use when: Two sides are locked into incompatible proposals and direct bargaining keeps failing.
Don't argue about trust.
"'Then you won't mind a contingent agreement. Your client will agree to make child support payments. We'll provide that if, for some inexplicable reason which you estimate at zero percent probability, he misses two payments, my client will get the equity in the house… and your client will no longer be liable for child support.' It is not easy for the husband's lawyer to object."
Why it matters
Don't argue about trust. Propose a bet on their own certainty: if they are as sure as they claim, the penalty costs them nothing, and refusing it exposes the bluff.
Use when: The other side insists something will never happen and you need a guarantee anyway.
Malta's prime minister timed escalating demands for the moment Britain thought it was done.
"Each time the British thought they had an agreement, he would say, 'Yes, agreed, but there is still one small problem.' And the small problem would turn out to be a £10 million cash advance or guaranteed jobs for dockyard and base workers for the life of the contract."
Why it matters
Malta's prime minister timed escalating demands for the moment Britain thought it was done. Name the tactic, take a break, and return insisting on principle. Never reward the nibble with an impulsive concession.
Use when: Every agreement you reach sprouts one more demand.
During the Kuwait Airways 422 hijacking, Kuwait never retreated on the core principle while every small practical matter was traded one at a time, each for more hostages.
"But local authorities in Cyprus and Algeria negotiated incessantly over things like permission for the plane to land, requests for additional fuel, access to news media, and deliveries of food. For each transaction these authorities successfully obtained the release of more hostages."
Why it matters
During the Kuwait Airways 422 hijacking, Kuwait never retreated on the core principle while every small practical matter was traded one at a time, each for more hostages. Hold the principle fixed; negotiate everything around it.
Use when: You must deal with someone whose core demand you can never meet.
The "exorbitant" price was really a desire to keep running the radio station.
"The negotiation consultant asked why the second owner was asking for such a high price. The businessman didn't know; he was assuming the seller would retire. 'Does the seller want to retire? What does she do now?'… the businessman offered to buy only that portion of the owner's interest he needed for tax reasons and to keep her on as manager."
Why it matters
The "exorbitant" price was really a desire to keep running the radio station. Buying less and keeping her as manager met the real interest for almost a million dollars less. When a price looks irrational, stop bidding and investigate the seller's life.
Use when: Raising your offer keeps failing and you have no idea why.
A bottom line is rigid and invites brinkmanship.
"It is useful to identify one far from perfect agreement that is better than your BATNA. Before accepting any agreement worse than this trip-wire package, you should take a break and reexamine the situation."
Why it matters
A bottom line is rigid and invites brinkmanship. A trip wire is an early-warning package: anything worse triggers an automatic pause, so fatigue or pressure can't slide you below your real minimum.
Use when: You are sending an agent to negotiate, or you fear you will accept a bad deal in the heat of the moment.
Turnbull pairs an easy yes (move out now) with his walk-away stated as someone else's suggestion, then distances himself with visible reluctance.
"TURNBULL: If you and I could reach agreement now, Paul and I would move out immediately. If we can't reach an agreement, the hearing examiner at the Rent Control Board suggested that we stay in the apartment and withhold rent and/or sue you for reimbursement, treble damages, and legal fees. Paul and I are extremely reluctant to take either of these courses."
Why it matters
Turnbull pairs an easy yes (move out now) with his walk-away stated as someone else's suggestion, then distances himself with visible reluctance. The threat is real but he never owns it, so Mrs. Jones can keep talking to him.
Use when: You need your walk-away to be vivid without making it a personal threat.
A threat only works if it gets delivered.
"At a coal mine where one of the authors was recently mediating, a large number of false but costly bomb threats were being received. These dropped off dramatically when the company's receptionist began answering all phone calls with 'Your voice is being recorded. What number are you calling?'"
Why it matters
A threat only works if it gets delivered. Make delivering it risky and the threats stop, with no counter-threat needed.
Use when: Someone keeps pressuring you through a channel you control.
The foreman said: "I pick Jones because he's the best.
"That was the fifth time in two weeks he sent me out of our group as a replacement. He's got it in for me, and I'm tired of it."
Why it matters
The foreman said: "I pick Jones because he's the best. I know I can trust him." The foreman meant it as praise. Jones read it as being picked on, and called a walkout. Nobody had asked.
Use when: You are sure you know why someone keeps doing the thing that bothers you.
The authors' reading of 1990: if complying doesn't visibly end the pain, and nobody has said exactly what counts as complying, the pain gives no reason to comply.
"The Council's resolutions clearly stated that Iraq must withdraw, but did not state that upon withdrawal sanctions would end. If Saddam Hussein believed that sanctions would continue after Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, then those sanctions, though unpleasant, provided no incentive for Iraq to leave."
Why it matters
The authors' reading of 1990: if complying doesn't visibly end the pain, and nobody has said exactly what counts as complying, the pain gives no reason to comply. Pressure must promise an end on compliance.
Use when: You are applying pressure and haven't said what would make you stop.